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a b s t r a c t 
Cities are increasingly influenced by novel and cosmopolitan values advanced by transna- 
tional technology providers and digital platforms. These values which are often visible in the 
advancement of the sharing economy and smart cities, may differ from the traditional pub- 
lic values protected by national and local laws and policies. This article contrasts the public 
values created by digital platforms in cities with the democratic and social national val- 
ues that the platform society is leaving behind. It innovates by showing how co-regulation 
can balance public values with platform values. In this article, we argue that despite the 
value-creation benefits produced by the digital platforms under analysis, public authorities 
should be aware of the risks of technocratic discourses and potential conflicts between plat- 
form and local values. In this context, we suggest a normative framework which enhances 
the need for a new kind of knowledge-service creation in the form of local public-interest 
technology. Moreover, our framework proposes a negotiated contractual system that seeks 
to balance platform values with public values in an attempt to address the digital enforce- 
ment problem driven by the functional sovereignty role of platforms. 










The digital revolution is not only a technological revolution,
but it is primarily a revolution of powers and values.2 In the
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 voice and who does not.4 Yet, their central role in promot- 
ng innovation and growth, creating new communication op- 
ortunities, and removing market entry barriers to small and 
edium enterprises is indisputable.5 Thus far, it has remained 
onetheless challenging to establish the precise value created 
y these platforms, how the values conveyed by these plat- 
orms differ from national public values, and whether they are 
ontributing to the emergence of a novel source of values par- 
llel to those of domestic law and policy.6 
A growing number of scholars from different fields has 
elved into the phenomenon of “platformisation” which seeks 
o convey the impact of digital platforms on cultural indus- 
ries, politics, and the economy.7 Legal scholars have con- 
ributed to this body of scholarship by explaining in general 
erms how the growing emergence of platform power and val- 
es is threatening fundamental rights, competition rules, and 
emocracy.8 This strand of literature has particularly delved 
nto the shortcomings of technology ( e.g ., opacity, complex- 
ty, biased algorithmic decision-making or discrimination).9 4 See for instance, Christopher S. Yoo, ‘Free Speech and the 
yth of the Internet as an Unintermediated Experience’ (2010) 
8 George Washington Law Review 697. See also the develop- 
ents regarding content moderation and intermediary liability 
t European Union level, Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar, 
ase C–18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v Facebook Ireland Limited, 
CLI:EU:C:2019:45; Daphne Keller, ‘Dolphins in the Net: Inter- 
et Content Filters and the Advocate General’s Glawischnig- 
iesczek v. Facebook Ireland Opinion’ ( Stanford Center for Inter- 
et and Society, 4 September 2019) < https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/ 
les/Dolphins- in- the- Net- AG- Analysis.pdf> . 
5 Communication from the European Commission to the Euro- 
ean Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social 
ommittee and the Committee of the Regions: Tackling Illegal 
ontent Online. Towards an Enhanced Responsibility for Online 
latforms. COM (2017) 555 final. 
6 Luca Belli, Pedro Francisco and Nicolo Zingales, ‘Law of the 
and or Law of the Platform? Beware of the Privatisation of Reg- 
lation and Police’ in Luca Belli and Nicolo Zingales (eds), Platform 
egulations. How Platforms Are Regulated and How They Regulate Us 
FGV, 2017) 59; Eyal Benvenisti, ‘Upholding Democracy Amid the 
hallenges of New Technology: What Role for the Law of Global 
overnance?’(2018) 29 European Journal of International Law 9; On 
latform values, see José van Dijck, Thomas Poell and Martijn de 
aal, The Platform Society: Public Values in a Connective World (Oxford 
niversity Press 2018). 
7 See e.g., Vera Demary, The Platformisation of Digi- 
al Markets, IW Policy Paper 39/2015, available at https: 
/www.iwkoeln.de/fileadmin/publikationen/2015/257401/ 
igital _ Markets _ policy _ paper _ IW _ Koeln.pdf; David B. Nieborg 
nd Thomas Poell, ‘The Platformisation of Cultural Production: 
heorizing the Contingent Cultural Commodity’(2018) 20 (11) 
ew Media & Society 4275; David B. Nieborg and Anne Helmond, 
The Political Message of Facebook’s Platformisation in the Mobile 
cosystem: Facebook Messengers as a Platform Instance’(2019) 41 
2) Media, Culture & Society 196; José van Dijck, Thomas Poell and 
artijn de Waal, De Platformsamenleving (Amsterdam University 
ress 2016) 17. 
8 See for instance Orla Lynskey, ‘Regulation by Platforms: The 
mpact on Fundamental Rights’ in Luca Belli and Nicolo Zingales 
eds), Platform Regulations. How Platforms Are Regulated and How They 
egulate Us (FGV 2017). 
9 See for instance Frank Pasquale, The Black Box Society: 
ow Secret Algorithms Control Money, Information (Cambridge, 









































owever, scholars may sometimes overlook that the impact 
f digital platforms is also experienced in the physical world 
t the most basic and local levels. Citizens see their neigh- 
ourhoods depleted of affordable houses due to the rise of 
irbnb or alike tourist accommodation, are surrounded by e- 
cooters and are often affected by the accidents, urban nui- 
ance and vandalism that has accompanied their prolifera- 
ion.10 At the same time, citizens also experience the preva- 
ence of digital platforms at other levels as the number of dig- 
tal municipal services provided by sophisticated platforms 
rows, or they realize that the tech companies contracted by 
heir cities collect data on every single step they take.11 The 
ecent destruction of multiple smart lightposts in Hong Kong 
n August 2019 as part of the demonstrations against the lo- 
al government, show the citizens’ growing rejection of this 
oss of privacy.12 In spite of these developments, the impact of 
latform power and values at local level has nonetheless re- 
ained overlooked.13 The reliance on digital technology pro- 
ided by Big Tech companies ( e.g ., Google/Alphabet) is not only 
utting the protection of human rights at stake, but it is also 
hanging the fulfilment of the mandate of public functions,
articularly because of the lack of scrutiny.14 Therefore, it is ess: The Secret Rules that Govern our Digital Lives (Cambridge: 
ambridge University Press, 2019). See also Rathenau Insti- 
ute, Digitaliseren vanuit publieke waarden ( Rathenau Institute , 6 
arch 2019) < https://www.rathenau.nl/nl/digitale-samenleving/ 
igitaliseren-vanuit-publieke-waarden > ; Tarleton Gillespie, The 
elevance of Algorithms, in Tarleton Gillespie, Pablo J Boczkowski, 
riste A Foot (eds) Media Technologies: Essays on communication, ma- 
eriality and society (MIT Press 2014) 167-194. 
10 James A. Allen, ‘Disrupting Affordable Housing: Regulating 
irbnb and Other Short-Term Rental Hosting in New York 
ity’(2017) 26 Journal of Affordable Housing and Community De- 
elopment Law 151; Dayne Lee, ‘How Airbnb Short-Term Rentals 
xacerbate Los Angeles’s Affordable Housing Crisis: Analysis and 
olicy Recommendation’(2016) 10 Harvard Law & Policy Review 229. 
11 Privacy International, ‘Smart cities: Utopian vision, Dystopian 
eality’ ( Amnesty International , 2017) < https://privacyinternational. 
rg/report/638/smart- cities- utopian- vision- dystopian- reality > ; 
iesbeth van Zoonen, ‘Privacy Concerns in Smart Cities’ (2016) 
3(3) Government Information Quarterly 472; Lilian Edwards, 
Privacy, Security and Data Protection in Smart Cities: A Critical 
U Perspective’ (2016) 3 European Data Protection Law Review 28. 
12 See for instance Ellen Ioanes, ‘Hong Kong protesters 
estroyed “smart” lampposts because they fear China 
s spying on them’ ( Business Insider , 26 August 2019) 
 https://www.businessinsider.nl/hong- kong- protesters- smart- 
ampposts- are- spying- on- them- 2019- 8?international=true&r= 
S > . See also Raj Gaire, Ratan K Ghosh, Jongkil Kim, Alexander 
rumpholz, Rajiv Ranjan, R K Shyamasundar et al., ‘Crowdsensing 
nd Privacy in Smart City Applications’ in Danda B Rawat and 
ayhan Zrar Ghafoor (eds) Smart Cities Cybersecurity and Privacy 
Elsevier 2019) 57; Kati Brock, Elke den Ouden, Kees van der Klauw, 
senia Podoynitsyna and Fred Langerak, ‘Light the way for smart 
ities: Lessons from Philips Lighting’ (2019) 142 Technological 
orecasting and Social Change 194; Daniel van den Buuse and Ans 
olk, ‘An exploration of smart city approaches by international 
CT firms’ (2019) 142 Technological Forecasting and Social Change 
olume 220. 
13 For reflections on platform power exercised globally, see for in- 
tance Orly Lobel, ‘The Law of the Platform’ (2016) 101 Minnesota 
aw Review 87. 
14 Rikke Frank Jørgensen, ‘What Platforms Mean When They 
alk about Human Rights’ (2017) 9 Policy and Internet 280; Lorna 
























































important to understand the underlying governance choices
made by public authorities and the values they decide to im-
bue them with.15 This article addresses this gap by inquiring
into the role and practices of digital platforms in urban cen-
ters in the contexts of smart cities and the sharing economy.16
Both phenomena are inserted in similar recent debates on the
digitalisation of urban centers, the promotion of innovation,
efficient allocation of urban resources, and sustainability.17 
Nonetheless, both sharing-economy and smart-city enabling
platforms have been accused of not being as citizen-centric,
sustainable, and protective of public values as they claim.18 
In addition, in both fields we find platforms with significant
market power developed by Big Tech that have the capacity
to impose their own values on public authorities. Small local
smart-city and sharing-economy platforms are thus outside
the present analysis, as our focus lies within Big Tech. 
In the sharing economy and smart cities, platforms me-
diate the relationship between citizens and government, re-
shaping it with their private data-driven and profit-oriented
values. Platforms do so because they track, collect, process,
and predict information regarding cities and citizens and they
support decision-making by relying on big data analysis tech-
niques such as machine learning.19 While focused on the in-
fluence of platforms in the regulation of local values, this ar-
ticle seeks to touch upon a crucial question with public policy
implications: What values do platforms convey in a city, and
how do they differ from public values? 
In answering this question, we explore the potential con-
flicts between private, profit-oriented platforms whose priori-
ties are defined by shareholders and their online communi-
ties, and the heterogeneous interests of local communities,McGregor, ‘Accountability for Governance Choices in Artificial In- 
telligence: Afterword to Eyal Benvenisti’s Foreword’(2019) 29 Euro- 
pean Journal of International Law 1079, 1084. 
15 Lorna McGregor, ‘Accountability for Governance Choices in Ar- 
tificial Intelligence: Afterword to Eyal Benvenisti’s Foreword’ (2019) 
29 European Journal of International Law 1079. 
16 Paula Gori, Pier Luigi Parcu and Maria Luisa Stasi, 
‘Smart Cities and Sharing Economy’ ( EUI , 2015) < https: 
//cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/38264/RSCAS _ 2015 _ 96. 
pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y > . 
17 See Duncan McLaren and Julian Agyeman, Sharing Cities: A Case 
for Truly Smart and Sustainable Cities (MIT Press 2015); Anthony 
Townsend, Smart Cities: Big Data, Civic Hackers, and the Quest for a 
New Utopi a (W W Norton 2013). 
18 For a criticism of smart cities, see for instance, Jiska Engelbert, 
Liesbet van Zoonen and Fadi Hirzalla, ‘Excluding citizens from 
the European smart city: The discourse practices of pursuing and 
granting smartness’ (2019) 142 Technological Forecasting and So- 
cial Change 347; Paolo Cardullo and Rob Kitchin, ‘Smart Urbanism 
and Smart Citizenship: The Neoliberal Logic of ‘Citizen-Focused’ 
Smart Cities In Europe’ (2018) 37 Environment and Planning C: Pol- 
itics and Space 813. On the sharing economy, see for instance, An- 
drea Geissinger, Christofer Laurell, Christina Öberg and Christian 
Sandström, ‘How sustainable is the sharing economy? On the sus- 
tainability connotations of sharing economy platforms’ (2019) 206 
Journal of Cleaner Production 419; Koen Frenken and Juliet Schor, 
‘Putting the sharing economy into perspective’ (2017) 23 Environ- 
mental Innovation and Societal Transitions 3. 
19 For a general overview of machine learning, see for instance 
Tom Mitchell et al., ‘Machine learning’ (1990) 4(1) Annual Review of 













citizens (including underrepresented minorities), and public
actors.20 In this context, we question the limited transparency
of platforms and how this undermines the task of determin-
ing the underlying platform values. From a methodological
perspective, this article draws its analysis on an interdisci-
plinary literature review (e.g., law, communication sciences,
business, public administration, new media studies) on smart
cities, platform values and value creation, as well as on the
qualitative content analysis of the terms of service of Airbnb
and Lime, and the promotional materials used on the web-
sites of Sidewalk Labs and IBM Smarter Cities as examples of
sharing economy and smart city platforms.21 
We argue that despite the value-creation benefits produced
by digital platforms, public authorities should be aware of the
risks of technocratic discourses and potential conflicts be-
tween platform and local values.22 It is in this context that we
aim to offer a normative framework for this problem through a
co-regulatory or negotiated system that seeks to balance plat-
form and public values.23 
This article’s contribution to existing literature is twofold:
first, it offers an innovative legal analysis of the broader im-
pact of digital platforms on public values in the urban context
(where platforms tend to have a stronger influence); second, it
suggests a normative framework for the protection of public
values, based on the notion of local public-interest technol-
ogy as well as on the introduction of an obligation to take into
account the broader impact of private services on public in-
frastructure. 
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly de-
scribes how digital platforms have evolved from their tradi-
tional role as business matchmakers to influential urban in-
termediaries. It first defines the notion of value, provides an
overview of the values of the platforms under analysis on
the grounds of their terms of service, and compares them
with public values identified on the basis of literature and
public policy documents. Section 3 explores the tension be-
tween platform and public values within the context of smart
cities and sharing-economy services and their impact on lo-
cal communities. Section 4 reflects upon the role of digital
platforms in smart cities and explains how these actors are
conveying their values as providers of public services, to con-
textualize the normative framework we propose for aligning
the values promoted by digital platforms and cities. Section 5
concludes. 
20 Tarleton Gillespie, Custodians of the Internet: Platforms, Content 
Moderation, and the Hidden Decisions That Shape Social Media (Yale 
University Press 2018). 
21 Klaus Krippendorff, Qualitative Content Analysis: An Introduc- 
tion to Its Methodology (Sage 2004) 15; Marnix Snel and Janaína de 
Moraes, Doing a systematic literature review in legal scholarship (Boom 
Juridische Uitgevers 2017). 
22 See also Sara Hofman et al., ‘The Public Sector’s Role in the 
Sharing Economy and the Implications for Public Values’ (2019) 
Government Information Quarterly (forthcoming). 
23 For a very brief analysis of co-regulation in the context of an 
earlier form of the sharing economy, see Michele Finck and Sofia 
Ranchordas, ‘Sharing and the City’ (2016) 49 Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 1299. 
















































































crimination in the Nascent Room-Sharing Economy’ (2014-2015) 
67 Stan L Rev Online 121; Irina Domurath, ‘Platforms as Contract 
Partners: Uber and beyond’ (2018) 25(5) Maastricht Journal of Eu- . Digital platforms and their values 
.1. The emergence of the urban platform economy 
n the early 1970s, students from Stanford University’s Artifi- 
ial Intelligence Laboratory concluded the world’s first digital 
eer-to-peer transaction, using ARPANET, the Internet’s pre- 
ursor network, to purchase drugs from fellow students from 
he Massachusetts Institute of Technology.24 Two decades 
ater, the New York Times was writing about the first sale 
ade on the Internet as we know it today, which entailed a 
ransaction consisting in a Sting CD.25 With the advent of mi- 
rocomputing and the rise of Internet penetration in individ- 
al households, e-commerce became the first industry that 
haped the notion of digital platforms as we currently identify 
hem, by turning the intermediation of consumer transactions 
nto a lucrative business model. As Internet users found more 
amiliarity in the virtual sphere, digital platforms ( e.g ., Google,
acebook, Twitter, eBay), already regarded as intermediaries,
tarted providing an increasingly wider range of information 
ociety services.26 The emergence of such intermediaries con- 
ributed to the development of online transactions, as these 
matchmakers’ hosted information, facilitated the intermedi- 
tion of transactions between strangers, and matched supply 
nd demand.27 About a decade ago, Airbnb, Uber, Lyft, and 
ther ‘sharing-economy’ platforms (broadly defined) started 
elying on this technology to offer services that would allow 
ndividuals to share their apartments, vehicles or other goods 
ith strangers.28 The sharing-economy disrupted at first ex- 
sting regulated sectors ( e.g ., hotels, taxis) and was at the out- 
et of significant litigation throughout the world. In the last 
ight years, the sharing economy, the ‘gig economy’ or the 
latform economy have occupied hundreds of legal scholars 
hroughout the world.29 As national and local governments 24 John Markoff, What the Dormouse Said: How the Sixties Counter- 
ulture Shaped the Personal Computer Industry (Penguin 2006) 20. See 
lso Jamie Bartlett, The Dark Net (Melvile House 2014). 
25 Peter H Lewis, ‘Attention Shoppers: Internet Is Open’ ( New 
ork Times , 21 August 1994) < https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/ 
2/business/attention- shoppers- internet- is- open.html > . 
26 See for instance, David Evans, ‘The Antitrust Economics of Two- 
ided Markets’ (2003) 20(2) Yale Journal on Regulation 327; also 
ore recently, David Evans and Richard Schmalensee, Matchmak- 
rs: The New Economics of Multisided Platforms (Harvard Business Re- 
iew Press 2016). 
27 Evans and Schmalensee fn 25. 
28 For early scholarship on the implications of the sharing econ- 
my see for instance Charles Gottlieb, ‘Residential Short-Term 
entals: Should Local Governments Regulate the Industry’ (2013) 
5 Planning & Envtl L 4; Anne-Marie Slaughter, ‘Filling Power Vac- 
ums in the New Global Legal Order’ (2013) 36 B C Int’l & Comp L 
ev 919. 
29 See for instance Vanessa Katz, ’Regulating the Sharing Econ- 
my’ (2015) 30 Berkeley Tech LJ 1067; John O McGinnis, ‘The Shar- 
ng Economy as an Equalizing Economy’ (2018) 94 Notre Dame L 
ev 329; Erez Aloni, ‘Pluralizing the Sharing Economy’ (2016) 91 
ash L Rev 1397; Matthew T Bodie, ‘Lessons from the Dramatists 
uild for the Platform Economy’ (2017) 2017 U Chi Legal F 17; Leah 
ing, ‘Social Impact and Technology: Issues of Access, Inequality 
nd Disputing in the Collaborative Economy’ (2014) 1 IJODR 150; 























tart bending or revising their legal frameworks to address the 
hallenges of unregulated sharing or ‘gig’ services, legal liter- 
ture has shifted its interest to other topics.30 However, this 
hift does not take into account one of the key impacts of the
latform economy: sharing-economy platforms are changing 
he landscape of cities and have a profound influence on local 
alues.31 
Although it has been clear for almost two decades that 
igital platforms would change our economy, platforms have 
hus far been regulated as value-neutral hosts of informa- 
ion.32 This traditional view no longer encompasses the cur- 
ent impact of digital platforms on our society, economy, and 
olitics.33 Digital platforms have become regulators, vehicles 
f communication, innovation, online dispute resolution, and 
alue creation.34 
Big Tech platforms in particular have become the new es- 
ential infrastructures for information, economic and politi- 
al influence.35 Although this phenomenon should not come 
s a surprise, the growing power of private platforms at the 
ocal level is nonetheless problematic for three reasons. First,
rban centers with the ambition to become smart cities are 
urrently partnering up with Big Tech to contract not only for 
oftware, but also to implement interconnected digital sen- 
ors and systems that influence the way cities are planned,
ow citizens move in a city, and the type of services offered.36 
hile, for example, Huawei offers useful digital platforms for 
ities, it is also well-known that this company has been under 
nvestigation in different countries on suspicion of espionage opean and Comparative Law 565; Christoph Busch, ‘The Sharing 
conomy at the CJEU: Does Airbnb Pass the Uber Test’ (2018) 7(4) 
ournal of European Consumer and Market Law 172; Sofia Ranchor- 
as, ‘Peers or Professionals: The P2P-Economy and Competition 
aw’ (2017) 1 Eur Competition & Reg L Rev 320. 
30 See for instance Andrew G Malik, ‘Worker Classification and 
he Gig-Economy’ (2017) 69 Rutgers UL Rev 1729, 1745; Michael L 
adler, ‘Independent Employees: A New Category of Workers for 
he Gig Economy’ (2018) 19 NC JL & Tech 443, 445. 
31 See for instance Sarah Kessler, ‘The “Sharing Econ- 
my” Is Dead, And We Killed It’ ( Fast Company , 14 
eptember 2015) < https://www.fastcompany.com/3050775/ 
he- sharing- economy- is- dead- and- we- killed- it > . 
32 See for instance, Richard Posner, ‘Antitrust in the New Econ- 
my’ (2000) 68 Antitrust L. J. 925. 
33 Van Dijck, Van Poell and de Waal fn 8. 
34 For a thorough analysis of the different roles of platforms, see 
ory van Loo, ‘The Corporation as Courthouse’ (2016) 33 Yale J. Reg. 
47, 553; Tarleton Gillespie, ‘The Politics of ‘Platforms’ (2010) 12(3) 
ew Media & Society 347; Tarleton Gillespie, Moderation, and the 
idden Decisions That Shape Social Media (Yale University Press 2018). 
35 K Sabeel Rahman, ‘Regulating Informational Infrastructure: In- 
ernet Platforms as the New Public Utilities’ (2018) 22 Georgetown 
aw Technology Review 234; Tarleton Gillespie, ‘Platforms Are Not 
ntermediaries’ (2018) 22 Georgetown Law Technology Review 198. 
36 Francisco Klauser, Till Paasche and Ola Söderström, ‘Smart 
ities as Corporate Storytelling’ (2014) 18(3) City 307; Anthony 
ownsend, Smart Cities: Big Data, Civic Hackers, and the Quest for a 
ew Utopi a (WW Norton & Company 2014) 64. 







































































40 Jean Damascene Twizeyimana and Annika Andersson, ‘The 
public Value of E-Government—A Literature Review’ (2019) 36 Gov- 
ernment Information Quarterly 167, 168. 
41 Ida Lindgren, Christian O. Madsen, Sara Hofmann and Ulf 
Melin, ‘Close Encounters of the Digital Kind: A Research Agenda and alleged trade-secret theft.37 This extreme example does
not necessarily reflect the practices of other Big Tech compa-
nies, but it helps us illustrate the risks of a potential misalign-
ment between public and private interests, the existence of
hidden interests, and the lack of transparency of digital plat-
forms. It is this lack of transparency that extends to the re-
lationship between public authorities and private platforms
not only in the context of public procurement and outsourcing
of IT-services but also when it comes to regulated platforms.
Another illustration is the relationship between Airbnb and
the municipality of Amsterdam. In the early days of home-
sharing in Amsterdam, the municipality celebrated a confi-
dential memorandum of understanding with Airbnb allowing
this platform to operate temporarily “beyond local law.”38 The
platform was able to establish itself very quickly to the grow-
ing discontent of Amsterdam residents and attract thousands
of hosts and guests. These type of arrangements or informal
partnerships are also found in the context of smart cities in
the mobility sector. Lime, the global leading platform for elec-
tric scooters, has recently partnered with the cities of Omaha,
Detroit, and Charlotte to reduce traffic congestion. This part-
nership has also been designed as a pilot to test the efficacy of
micro-mobility (e.g., electric scooters) to improve urban mobil-
ity. However, as this article later explains, such arrangements
are not as unproblematic as they seem. 
Second, as a result of the expansion of digital platforms in
cities, their values and related global trends ( e.g ., cosmopoli-
tan tourism) appear to have started to prevail in the context of
these contractual or informal ‘partnerships’ and over national
public values, resulting in the decharacterisation of neigh-
bourhoods, exclusion of residents from the city center, and
gentrification of traditional urban centers. Third, as cities be-
come imbued with platform values, we observe a new shift in
the power dynamics from public authorities to private actors
that do not pursue the public interest with a certain measure
of democratic legitimacy. The cooperation between public and
private actors results thus not only in the privatisation of pub-
lic services but also in the transformation of public values.39 
This phenomenon is connected to the more general problem
of misalignment of public and private interests. While both
public and private entities tend to attend to the interests and
needs of their customers, it is well-known they do it in very37 Adi Robertson, ‘Huawei executive accused of help- 
ing steal trade secrets’ ( The Verge , 22 May 2019) 
< https://www.theverge.com/2019/5/22/18636237/huawei- 
cnex- trade- secrets- lawsuit- eric- xu- accusation- trial- hearing> . 
See also Michael Plachta and Bruce Zagaris, ‘Sanctions and Int’l 
Human Rights’ (2019) 35 IELR 62, 65. 
38 This document is available at https://www. 
binnenlandsbestuur.nl/Uploads/2016/2/2014- 12- airbnb- ireland- 
amsterdam-mou.pdf (last accessed on October 7, 2019). As it was 
initially unclear whether Airbnb fitted within existing legal qual- 
ifications and the platform did not violate directly any national 
or local rules, it is important to underline that the municipality 
merely agreed not to enforce existing rules on tourist accom- 
modation as regards Airbnb hosts. This position has changed 
considerably since 2014. The platform has signed more recent 
agreements with the municipality to help the latter enforce new 
rules that restrict the maximal rental period. 
39 For a critical analysis of the privatisation of city services, see 
Gerald Frug, ‘City Services’ (1998) 73 N. Y. U. Law Rev . 23, 29-30. different ways.40 The boundary between the public sphere and
the respective rights and duties of citizens has become thus
blurred due to the growing power of digital platforms that not
only offer commercial services to consumers but also disrupt
once regulated services and digitise local services, reshaping
the relationship between public authorities and citizens.41 
2.2. Platforms as generators of values 
Thus far, the notion of ‘digital platform’ has been used to de-
pict BigTech intermediaries, whether within the realm of the
‘sharing’ or ‘gig’ economy, or outside it, for example on social
media.42 The core technology transacted by these companies
has been software (e.g., apps, online platforms) developed on
the basis and/or for the enabling of big data collection. With
the increase of functionalities performed by connected ma-
chines on the Internet of Things (‘IoT’), we advance the idea
that the next generation of digital platforms will be defined
by companies that add electrical engineering expertise (e.g.
hardware). New digital platforms will not only be present in
smartphones and other personal computing devices, but also
in machines from the physical public or private space that did
not traditionally include a computer and urban furniture, such
as lightposts.43 This article thus uses a broader definition of
‘digital platforms’ which also includes platforms that are de-
veloped to support different types of sensors. 
Before delving into the matter of what values are conveyed
by digital platforms, we must acknowledge what we mean
by ‘value’. ‘Value’ is a concept that can be interpreted in a
plethora of ways, as it has importance for philosophy, eco-
nomics, sociology, public administration and law, to name a
few examples. In this article, we employ it to reflect on moral
qualities, as values ‘are the principia of practical thought.’ 44
Given that the morality dimension implies the consideration
of what is right and what is wrong,45 the notion of ‘value’ asfor the Digitalisation of Public Services’ 1(2019) 36 Government In- 
formation Quarterly 427, 432. 
42 Social media is often not included in scholarship on the gig 
economy, although Youtube, launched in 2005, predates Airbnb 
and Uber, launched in 2008 and respectively in 2009, and it has a 
similar business model: connecting a broadcaster to a peer audi- 
ence. See Catalina Goanta and Sofia Ranchordás, ‘The Regulation of 
Social Media Influencers: An Introduction’ in Catalina Goanta and 
Sofia Ranchordás, The Regulation of Social Media Influencers (Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2020, forthcoming). 
43 Some of these platforms are not new. An example is IBM, one 
of the oldest companies in the history of computing, see James 
W. Cortada, IBM: The Rise and Fall and Reinvention of a Global Icon 
(MIT Press 2019). See for instance Bruce Schneier, Click Here to Kill 
Everybody (WW Norton & Company 2018). 
44 Peter Railton, Facts, Values and Norms: Essays Towards a Moral- 
ity of Consequence (Cambridge University Press 2003) 43. See also 
Nicolai Hartmann, Moral Values (Routledge 2017) 2. 
45 Salomon Rettig and Benjamin Pasamanick, ‘Changes in Moral 
Values over Three Decades, 1929–1958’ (1959) 6 Soc Probs 320, 321. 
See also Helmut Coing, ‘Analysis of Moral Values by Case-Law’ 

















































































escribed in the following sections encompasses what digital 
latforms associate with these two directions. 
When discussing values, it is equally essential to under- 
tand not only who holds the values, but also to identify the 
takeholders in relation to which such values are held. On 
he basis of this distinction, the values of digital platforms 
re manifold, and reflect a diverse ecosystem of stakeholders.
or instance, the value of providing affordability to a customer 
ay come at the expense of the interests of workers hired by 
he platform. In another example, public institutions are sup- 
osed to be the embodiment of values endorsed by society at 
arge (e.g. welfare), yet have an equally important interest in 
aintaining healthy markets. 
This brings us to another necessary clarification, namely 
he difference between values and interests.46 To illustrate 
his, in their role as privately-held companies, platforms are 
uided by one central interest: profit maximisation.47 In itself,
his may signal values such as responsibility towards share- 
olders. Yet, there may be other values companies adhere to,
r claim they adhere to, which could potentially be – at least 
n some ways – contrary to their interests.48 
While many taxonomies already map and classify public 
alues,49 there seems to be no consensus regarding what may 
e considered as a value, whether in the public or the private 
ector. It could be argued that the public sector may be defined 
y having to represent the social values held by society at large 
e.g., what society perceives as right or wrong), while in the 
rivate sector, the immediate interpretation of the concept of 1987) 65 Washington University Law Quarterly 711; Thomas Lee 
azen, ‘The Corporate Persona, Contract (and Market) Failure, and 
oral Values’ (1990) 69 North Carolina Law Review 273; James 
itchcock, ‘Church, State, and Moral Values: The Limits of Ameri- 
an Pluralism’ (1981) 44 Law & Contemporary Problems 3. 
46 See, e.g ., Margaret Jane Radin, ‘Government Interests and Tak- 
ngs: Cultural Commitments of Property and the Role of Political 
heory’ in Stephen E Gottlieb (eds.), Public Values in Constitutional 
aw (University of Michigan Press 1993) 69. 
47 See for instance Ian B Lee, ‘Corporate Law, Profit Maximisation, 
nd the Responsible Shareholder’ (2005) 10 Stan JL Bus & Fin 31. 
48 See for instance Shlomit Azgad-Tromer, ‘The Virtuous Corpora- 
ion: On Corporate Social Motivation and Law’ (2017) 19 U Pa J Bus L 
41; Angus Corbett, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility - Do We Have 
ood Cause to be Sceptical about It’ (2008) 17 Griffith L Rev 413; Tan 
eng Teck and Chang Jau Ho and Liau Chee How and Nanthaku- 
ar Karuppiah and William Chua, ‘A Theorisation on the Impact 
f Responsive Corporate Social Responsibility on the Moral Dispo- 
ition, Change and Reputation of Business Organisations’ (2018) 8 J 
gmt & Sustainability 105. 
49 See for instance Sara Hofmann, Øystein Sæbø, Alessio Maria 
raccini and Stefano Za, ‘The public sector’s roles in the sharing 
conomy and the implications for public values’, Government In- 
ormation Quarterly 1 < https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/ 
rticle/pii/S0740624X18304106#bb0305 > ; Mayuree Yotawut, ‘Ex- 
mining progress in research on public value’ (2018) 39(1) Kaset- 
art Journal of Social Sciences 168; Mark H Moore, Recognising Public 
alue (Harvard University Press 2013); Briggite Unger, Daan van Der 
inde, Michael Getzner, Public or Private Goods? Redefining Res 
ublica (Edward Elgar Publishing 2017) 232; John Benington and 
ark H Moore, Public Value: Theory and Practice (Palgrave Macmillan 
011); Hal G Rainey and Barry Bozeman, ‘Comparing public and 
rivate organisations: Empirical research and the power of the a 





























value’ reflects the economic values of markets.50 Public and 
rivate values are nonetheless not strictly divided, as corpo- 
ations should embrace social values just as much as govern- 
ent embraces economic values.51 
Extracting values is a research exercise which may entail 
 wide array of methods, whether qualitative or quantita- 
ive.52 This article combines a small qualitative content anal- 
sis with a literature review to identify, analyze and compare 
latform values and public values.53 
.3. Platform values 
.3.1. The platform economy and its vision 
he platform economy benefited from particular regular le- 
iency in its early days. In the light of the regulatory subsi- 
ies they have received in the past decades,54 platforms have 
raditionally governed themselves through self-regulation.55 
owever, given their growing power even as private actors,
latforms may even be considered as ‘norm-creating actors 
esides or within the state’ in a legal pluralist understand- 
ng.56 According to this understanding, platforms create their 
wn legal orders, which complement or compete with the 
overeignty of the state in making rules. From this perspective,
he self-defined standards enacted by digital platforms give 
xpression to private values which may have an economic or 
ocial nature, and are in turn aligned to the platform’s inter- 
sts. These interests may be different from those of the public 
erved by the platform, yet their imposition is possible due to 
isparities in bargaining power. 
This section first addresses the nature of the private/self- 
egulatory instruments drafted by platforms, and subse- 50 See for instance Robert T Slee, Private Capital Markets: Valua- 
ion, Capitalisation, and Transfer of Private Business Interests (Wiley 
nd Sons 2011); Mariana Mazzucato, The Value of Everything: Making 
nd Taking in the Global Economy (Penguin Books 2018). 
51 Moore, fn 47. See also Phillip Crowson, ‘Adding public value: 
he limits of corporate responsibility’ (2009) 34(3) Resources Policy 
05. 
52 Elena Harman, Tarek Azzam, ‘Incorporating public values into 
valuative criteria: Using crowdsourcing to identify criteria and 
tandards’ (2018) 71 Evaluation and Program Planning 68. 
53 See fn 17. 
54 For instance, in the light of the Cambridge Analytica incident, 
howcasing the lack of accountability mechanisms for sharing 
ser data with third parties, Mark Zuckerberg has even called for 
ore government regulation, The Economist, ‘Mark Zuckerberg 
ays he wants more regulation for Facebook’ ( The Economist , 6 
pril 2019) < https://www.economist.com/business/2019/04/06/ 
ark- zuckerberg- says- he- wants- more- regulation- for- facebook > . 
or the regulation of sharing-economy platforms, see for instance, 
tephen R. Miller, ‘First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Econ- 
my’ (2016) 53 Harv. J. on Legis. 147; Daniel E. Rauch and David 
chleicher, ‘Like Uber, But for Local Governmental Policy: The 
uture of Local Regulation of the “Sharing Economy”’ (2015) Geo. 
ason L.& Econ. Research Paper; Lobel, fn 11. 
55 Christoph Busch, ‘Self-Regulation and Regulatory Intermedi- 
tion in the Platform Economy’ forthcoming in Marta Cantero 
amito and Hans-Wolfgang Micklitz (eds) The Role of the EU in 
ransnational Legal Ordering: Standards, Contracts and Codes (Edward 
lgar 2019). 
56 Vanessa Mak, ‘Pluralism in European Private Law’ (2018) 20 
ambridge Yearbook of European Legal Studies 202, 219. 























































































59 Lya G. Soeteman-Hernandez, Margarita D. Apostolova, Cindy 
Bekker, Susan Dekkers, Roland C. Grafström, Monique Groe- 
newold, et al. ‘Safe innovation approach: Towards an agile sys- 
tem for dealing with innovations’ (2019) Materials Today Com- 
munications < https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ 
S2352492818304239 > . 
60 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in 
consumer contracts [1993] OJ 1993, L 95; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 quently discusses selected examples of platform values which
may be extracted from the terms of service (‘ToS’) and commu-
nity guidelines of platforms that have an impact on cities. For
this purpose, we have selected four representative platforms:
Airbnb and Lime (as sharing economy platforms), and Side-
walk Labs and IBM Smarter Cities (as smart city platforms). 
2.3.2. Voluntary and mandatory values 
Norm creation by platforms takes the form of ToS, policies and
community guidelines. It is also in these documents that we
may find the vision that a platform would like to convey as
well as the values it holds dear and imposes on its users. As
their goal is to define transactional behavior, platforms em-
ploy mainly contracts as their primary self-regulatory instru-
ments. Typically, sharing economy platforms create a contrac-
tual relationship between the platform and the user on the
basis of the platform’s general terms. Once all relevant condi-
tions are met (e.g., offer and acceptance), the standard terms
delineate the rights and obligations of the parties, and in
principle—though depending on the jurisdiction—the terms
are binding on the parties to this contract. Due to the scale
at which it is used, this contract cannot be negotiated, which
results in the platform acting as a self-regulator who defines
and imposes its own values onto its users. In contrast, smart
city platforms negotiate contracts with local authorities, and
these contracts shape the private regulatory framework gov-
erning the relationship between the transacting parties. In
practice, the ability of local public authorities to truly nego-
tiate these terms may also depend on the dimension and eco-
nomic power of the city in question. 
In this section, we distinguish between two types of values
conveyed by platforms to the communities they serve through
their services. Voluntary values reflect standards which are not
required by state-made law, such as economic values arising
out of the provision of customer service. Efficiency and effec-
tiveness are in fact vital for businesses to establish a standard
of care for the consumer’s needs and build their reputation as
trustworthy contracting partners.57 In the public sector, pub-
lic bodies also embrace efficiency and effectiveness as public
values in order to ensure that public bodies are pursuing the
public interest in the best possible way. However, voluntary
values may also produce negative externalities. Consumer-
oriented values may come at the expense of other stakeholder
interests: to meet delivery deadlines, Amazon employees are
assigned a performance rate considered by many as inhu-
mane.58 Moreover, in the absence of clear public legal stan-
dards, platforms may not only embrace what is explicitly al-
lowed, but also what is not explicitly prohibited. An example
in this respect are arbitration clauses, which are always unfa-
vorable for consumers because they restrict access to justice
and impose unnecessarily high costs on resolving disputes57 See for instance J. Rose, J.S. Persson, L.T. Heeager and Z. 
Irani, ‘Managing e-Government: value positions and relationships’ 
(2015) 25(5) Information Systems Journal 531. 
58 Josh Dzieza, ‘“Beat The Machine”: Amazon Warehouse Work- 
ers Strike To Protest Inhumane Conditions’ (The Verge, 16 
July 2019) < https://www.theverge.com/2019/7/16/20696154/ 
amazon- prime- day- 2019- strike- warehouse- workers- inhumane- 
conditions- the- rate- productivity > . arising out of business-to-consumer (‘B2C’) transactions. In ju-
risdictions where they are not prohibited, companies impose
them on consumers by virtue of the ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ nature
of the terms of service. 
As digital platforms adapt to new regulations, compliance
becomes an actively pursued interest which increases the
level of protection offered to individuals, and translates into
an adoption of public values into the private legal frame-
work.59 With the emergence of stringent regulatory frame-
works focused on individual protections ( e.g ., the Unfair Con-
tract Terms Directive, the European General Data Protection
Regulation), the bargaining power gap between digital plat-
forms and users is somewhat reduced.60 The values promoted
by platforms in their compliance efforts may be considered as
mandatory values . 
A subsequent question in the case of sharing economy
platforms arises with respect to the nature of the contract
concluded between the digital platform and the user. While
the specific qualification may depend on the nature of the
industry in which the platform is active, the intermediation
provided by the platform is an information service. Under the
framework of the European consumer protection applicable
to B2C-transactions, a contract regarding an information ser-
vice is considered a contract for digital content, either ‘allow-
ing the creation, processing or storage of data in digital form’
or ‘allowing sharing of and any other interaction with data in
digital form provided by other users of the service’.61 
What is more difficult to ascertain is the legal nature
of policies and community guidelines which tend to be the
source of platform values or at least the documents in which
they are conveyed to the public. There are three ways in which
these instruments can generally be interpreted. First, policies
and community guidelines can be considered to be part of the
standard terms, and thus binding to the extent allowed by na-
tional contract law. Second, they may be qualified as codes
of conduct adopted by the platforms, and thus with a more
limited binding force.62 Third, depending on the nature of the
provisions referred to in the various complementary instru-
ments, it could be argued that some clauses may be legally
binding (and thus part of the standard terms), while others
may not (and consequently be seen as provisions from a code
of conduct). This distinction is highly relevant when dealingof the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on 
the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repeal- 
ing Directive 95/46/EC [2016] OJ 2016, L 119. 
61 Article 2 (b) and (c), Proposal for a Directive on certain aspects 
concerning contracts for the supply of digital content, COM(2015) 
634 final. 
62 Anna Beckers, ‘Towards a Regulatory Private Law Approach for 
CSR Self-Regulation? The Effect of Private Law on Corporate CSR 
Strategies’ (2019) 27(2) European Review of Private Law 221-244. 
































































































69 Clause 5.1(iii) Lime User Agreement. 
70 This clause, just as the rest of the User Agreement, is valid 
only to the extent it does not contravene to mandatory rules at ith the enforcement of standards that reflect values. For in- 
tance, a value such as accountability may be expressed by a 
latform in its community guidelines. However, if guidelines 
re considered not to have any binding force, the value ex- 
ression does not lead to any rights or remedies that could 
nforce it in practice. To illustrate these distinctions, the fol- 
owing section delves into the private/self-regulatory instru- 
ents employed by Airbnb, Sidewalk Labs and IBM Smarter 
ities and further discusses selected provisions. 
.3.3. Platform values in terms of service and marketing ma- 
erials 
hen users make accounts on Airbnb, they agree to the 
latform’s ToS, a document with almost 25,000 words which 
ill represent the basis of their agreement. The ToS includes 
lauses referring to the platform’s content and reflects the in- 
ermediary nature of Airbnb, as it accounts for its relation- 
hip with hosts, but also with tenants/guests. The ToS show- 
ase the bargaining power exercised in the transactional tri- 
ngle (Airbnb – hosts – guests). For instance, Airbnb applies 
he same standard to both hosts and renters when it comes 
o content. On the one hand, Airbnb grants users a ‘limited,
on-exclusive, non-sublicensable, revocable, non-transferable 
icense’ to download and access content on the platform, in- 
luding that of other users.63 On the other hand, the content 
reated by members themselves is licensed to Airbnb using a 
non-exclusive, worldwide, royalty-free, irrevocable, perpetual 
or for the term of the protection), sub-licensable and trans- 
erable license’.64 However, when looking at the exclusion of 
iability clauses, Airbnb imposes exclusions not only with re- 
pect to its own obligations,65 but also to those of hosts.66 
he ToS do acknowledge such exclusions may be unlawful in 
ome jurisdictions, and thus specify that they only apply to 
he maximum extent permitted by law. Just like every other 
latform under scrutiny, Airbnb also has a privacy policy, and 
n addition, a copyright policy, and a cookie policy. Many of the 
lauses included in such policies deal with disclosures, mostly 
andated by law (e.g., data retention and erasure 67 ). 
A more recent type of sharing economy service that cur- 
ently enjoys enormous popularity in smart cities, is that of 
icromobility. Popular platforms like Lime change the con- 
ractual constellation through their business model, by inter- 
ediating and providing access to a fleet of company-owned 
lectric scooters deployed on the streets of a given city.68 
hile Uber built its business model on not purchasing cars,
ut rather relying on the cars of its riders, e-scooter businesses 
ntail the ride-sharing company is the one making the entire 
nfrastructure available to the public. This infrastructure gen- 
rally consists in the digital platform (website and app), and 63 Clause 5.4 Airbnb ToS. 
64 Clause 5.5 Airbnb ToS. 
65 Clause 17 Airbnb ToS. 
66 Airbnb Experiences Guest Release and Waiver, < https://www. 
irbnb.com/terms/experiences _ guest _ waiver > . 
67 Clause 6.4 Airbnb Privacy Policy < https://www.airbnb.com/ 
erms/privacy _ policy#sec6 > . 
68 Cornelius Hardt Klaus Bogenberger, ‘Usage of e-Scooters in 










he e-scooter fleet (including parking locations). As the con- 
umer only interacts with the platform, both for data tracking 
 e.g ., using the platform digital infrastructure for finding the 
-scooters on a map), as well as the rental of goods, a B2C-
ontract arises. The rental of Lime products (the company also 
as a fleet of bikes, e-bikes and ridesharing vehicles) is at the 
ore of what it calls the ‘User Agreement’, an approximately 
8,000 word-long set of standard terms that overall empha- 
ize values such as safety, the protection of minors, but also 
eneral user obligations when using the e-scooter. In addi- 
ion, Lime imposes on the user the company’s release of any 
ollective claims relating to its products, showing that what- 
ver fairness value may be imbued in the general terms, the 
ompany tries to restrict it by limiting the customer’s access 
o justice. Interestingly, the User Agreement extends this re- 
ease to third parties such as employees, agents or affiliates,
ut more importantly, it also stipulates this release to the ben- 
fit of ‘municipalities and public entities (including all of their 
espective elected and appointed officers, officials, employees 
nd agents) which authorize Lime to operate any of its Ser- 
ices.’ 69 In other words, the standard terms consumers need 
o agree to before using Lime products and services exclude 
he possibility of bringing collective claims against public ad- 
inistration entities on the basis of this use.70 
Another point that deserves particular attention is re- 
ected by data collection and transfers. GPS tracking as that 
ound at the core of the Lime application is infamously sen- 
itive, as it can trace an individual’s location history, thereby 
aising serious data protection (but also moral) questions.71 
ackers who disassemble Lime GPS modules have revealed 
hat these are devices (micro-computers) that run on An- 
roid and have a 4G-SIM card, which entails that e-scooters 
re connected to the Internet.72 In combination with the ac- 
nowledgement that ‘Lime may disclose aggregate and other 
ata about [the consumer] in accordance with applicable law,
ncluding, without limitation, general latitude and longitude 
ata for [consumer] addresses (provided this would not al- 
ow any individual’s address to be separately identified)’,73 this 
ay raise additional concerns. Sharing allegedly anonymized 
ata with third parties without any further specifications may 
islead consumers when using the Lime app. Especially since 
ime seems to collaborate with Uber,74 and this collabora- 
ion entails data sharing between the two companies, trans- 
arency ought to be one of the guiding values promoted by 
ime, but it is not. he national level. For instance, according to European consumer 
aw, this clause may be judicially deemed unfair according to the 
nfair Contract Terms Directive, fn 58. 
71 Associated Press, ‘”Tracking every place you go”: Weather 
hannel app accused of selling user data’ ( The Guardian , 5 Jan- 
ary 2019) < https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/jan/ 
4/weather-channel-app-lawsuit-location-data-selling> . 
72 Scootertalk, see < https://scootertalk.org/forum/viewtopic. 
hp?t=1370 > . 
73 Clause 10.1 Lime User Agreement. 
74 Lime mentions this on its website, see < https://www.li.me/ 
ime- uber- electric- scooter > . 
























































































It could be argued that a smart city platform like Sidewalk
Labs uses technology to create urban development solutions
to problems such as rising rents, traffic congestion, or air pol-
lution. These types of projects require collaboration between
the platform local government and local communities. This
role places such a service provider in a different type of inter-
mediation, whereby local government, itself unable to gener-
ate public-interest technology, outsources this process to tech
companies.75 As its clients are not peers, but local govern-
ments, contractual frameworks will most likely take place un-
der strict rules of national and local administrative law and
European public procurement. These contractual terms are
thus not made fully available on the company’s website which
means that our value analysis is complemented here by the
literature and the media discussion of specific projects devel-
oped by Big Tech platforms. This lack of transparency is also
applicable to additional websites made for specific projects
belonging to Sidewalk Labs, such as Replica, an urban plan-
ning tool.76 As an example of the way in which Sidewalk Lab
operates, we can shift our attention to the Sidewalk Toronto
project, meant to ‘shape the city’s future and provide a global
model for inclusive urban growth’.77 Sidewalk published the
project Master Innovation and Development Plans (MDIPs) on
its website, and while it is not clear whether these are the final
plans considered for implementation, this publication can be
seen as an attempt to embrace transparency towards project
stakeholders. In addition, by taking into account digital ac-
cessibility needs and ensuring that such plans can be read by
citizens facing various physical barriers,78 another value that
can be underlined is that of accessibility. As for the content of
the MDIPs, Sidewalk Labs lists its own eight commitments of
the Proposed Innovation and Funding Partnership, including
the deployment of ‘cutting-edge technologies to improve ur-
ban life’, ‘spur[ring] economic development’, or ‘sharing prof-
its associated with certain technologies with the public sec-
tor’, which generally reflect economic and social values tai-
lored to the needs of a public administration client. 
The same approach is taken by IBM Smarter Cities, as
it already works with cities such as Busan (Korea), Palermo
(Italy), San Isidro (Argentina), San Jose (US), and Yamagata City
(Japan) in the context of a pro bono system where IBM would
offer consultancy on matters such as public safety, economic
development, affordable housing and even social services.79 
IBM Smarter Cities is the vision and set of technology so-
lutions touting potential contributions to what it calls ‘cog-75 David Eaves, Kevin Frazier and Lavanya Singh, ‘Pub- 
lic Interest Technology’ ( Medium , 22 February 2019) < https: 
//medium.com/digitalhks/entry- i- public- interest- technology- 
a- brief- look- to- the- past- to- identify- pit- in- the- present- 
bb72cadd593c > . 
76 See Replica, < https://replicahq.com > . 
77 See Sidewalk Toronto, < https://www.sidewalktoronto.ca/ 
accessible-midp > . 
78 Ibid. Public documents are said to be ‘WCAG 2.0 AA compliant 
and have been validated on PAC3, Adobe Acrobat Pro DC Accessi- 
bility Checker’. 
79 Smart Cities World, ‘Five cities land IBM Smarter Cities 
Challenge grants’ ( Smart Cities World , 21 July 2017) < https: 
//www.smartcitiesworld.net/news/news/five- cities- land- ibm- 








nitive government’ and covering policy areas such as public
safety, smart buildings and urban planning. Similarly to Side-
walk Labs, IBM Smarter Cities does not target consumers, and
therefore its business model does not need to account for any
contractual B2C framework. Out of the areas of interests listed
on its website, IBM Smarter Cities safety, social services and
affordable housing can be translated into the values of citizen
safety, care (welfare), and affordability, and additional values
may be inferred – albeit with less clarity - from other areas of
interest (e.g., economic development may or may not promote
the value of equality).80 
The examples of digital intermediaries we reflected upon
so far in this section account for a wide range of contractual
practices employed for the private governance of (mostly B2C)
intermediated transactions. Where intermediaries publicize
ToS, as was the case for Airbnb and Lime, we can observe a dra-
matic contrast between the marketing language used to en-
tice consumers, and the overwhelmingly lengthy and carefully
worded contractual clauses that primarily aim to limit the
platform’s liability, and create frameworks that might appear
compliant with legal standards. Yet, what are the true val-
ues and interests of the platform when drafting such terms?
For instance, Lime claims that agreeing to its ToS entails giv-
ing Lime ‘the right to photograph, videotape, and otherwise
record [the consumer’s] appearance and voice related to [the
consumer’s] use of the Services, at any time and from time to
time.’ 81 It is unclear what this right aims to achieve. Does it
entail that the SIM cards in the GPS module can be used for
recordings? The mere consideration that an important con-
tractual clause like this may leave too much space for in-
terpretation should raise concerns regarding the commercial
intentions leading to the ToS. Lime may tout its services as
‘cleaner and less expensive than a rideshare’, or claim that it
is ‘working with city, university and community partners to
enable smart micro-mobility around the world’,82 thereby im-
plying to embrace values such as affordability, collaboration
and sustainability. Still, limitation of liability clauses, espe-
cially when imposed in legal systems that do not specifically
prohibit them, may also show an overarching economic inter-
est that can be said to overpower a value such as fairness. Sim-
ilarly, Airbnb’s marketing speaks about ‘unforgettable trips’,
‘adventures nearby or in faraway places and access unique
homes, experiences, and places around the world,’ 83 which
may reflect values related to improving the human experi-
ence, such as increasing the livelihood of the global citizen.
However, as mentioned above, this sometimes comes at the
cost of other stakeholders not targeted by these values, such
as locals whose cities become overcrowded by tourism, and
who need to bear the negative effects of the imposed platform
values. Given the nature of their services and the lack of user
agreements, Sidewalk Labs and IBM Smarter Cities list values
in their mission statements.84 These values are the same as80 Ibid. 
81 Clause 12.7 Lime User Agreement. 
82 See Lime website, < https://www.limebike.com > . 
83 See Airbnb website, < https://www.airbnb.com > . 
84 For instance, Sidewalk Labs: standards of sustainability, af- 
fordability, mobility, and economic opportunity, see < https://www. 
sidewalklabs.com/mission/ > . 

























































































89 Local Government Act of 2000, Section 4. 
90 See Gerry Stoker, ‘Public Value Management: A New Narrative 
for Networked Governance?’ (2006) 36 American Public Adminis- 
tration Review 41; Collin Talbot, ‘Measuring Public Value—A Com- 
peting Values Approach’ (The Work Foundation, 2008). hose portrayed by the sharing economy platforms in the dis- 
ussion above, yet it remains to be seen what kind of values 
re taken over in the contractual framework with their clients.
s contracts capture the intention of the parties with respect 
o a specific transaction, or even within a broader context than 
he transaction itself, they are useful in interpreting what this 
ntention actually is. In principle, platforms may have well- 
rticulated visions about their role in society. However, a closer 
ook at the values these platforms claim to support shows not 
nly that transnational (or ‘cosmopolitan’) values are applied 
ith disregard for national and local values but also that the 
mplementation of platform values in their business practices 
ay vary considerably. 
In the next section, these values will be discussed in com- 
arison with public values driven by public interest, in order to 
etter gauge the potential conflicts emerging out of the pub- 
ic/private divide as applied to the context of smart cities. 
. Platform values versus public values in the 
mart city 
.1. Defining public values 
he protection of public values is inherently linked to the pur- 
uit of the public interest. Yet, these two concepts are distinct.
he ‘public interest’ represents an ideal that changes with 
ime and place rather than an identifiable content, it refers 
o the pursuit of the outcomes that best ‘serve the long-term 
urvival and well-being of a social collective constituted pub- 
ic.’ 85 Public values are those normative judgments that reflect 
a consensus about rights, benefits, and prerogatives to which 
itizens should and should not be entitled to; the obligations 
f citizens to society, the state, and one another; and the prin- 
iples on which government and policies could be based.’ 86 
ublic values are thus broader than rights. For example, ac- 
ountability, inclusiveness, and efficiency refer to rights that 
itizens may have (for example, the right to have access to 
ertain documents or the right not to be discriminated) but 
hey also include a moral dimension that goes beyond legal 
ights.87 Drawing on this characterisation, it is clear that any 
ist of national public values is by definition incomplete. In this 
ection, we focus on the public values that are particularly im- 
ortant for cities and we identify a set of public values that 
re mentioned on a regular basis in national legislation, local 
olicy documents, and scholarship.88 To illustrate this point,85 Barry Bozeman, Public Values and Public Interest: Counterbalancing 
conomic Individualism (George Washington University Press 2007) 
2. 
86 Ibid. 13-14. 
87 Frank Bannister and Regina Connolly, ‘ICT, Public Values and 
ransformative Government: A Framework and Programme for Re- 
earch’ (2014) 31 Government Information Quarterly 119, 120. 
88 See for instance Saskia Sassen, The Global City (Princeton Uni- 
ersity Press, 2001); Peter J Taylor amd Ben Deruder, World City Net- 
ork: A Global Urban Analysis (Routledge 2015); Mark Amen et al. 
eds), Cities and Global Governance: New Sites for International Rela- 
ions (Routledge, 2016); Nestor Davidson and Geeta Tewari (eds ), 














hile each English city has its own policies and local values,
he Local Government Act of 2000 states that the objective of 
ny local authority should be ‘the promotion or improvement 
f the economic, social and environmental well-being of their 
rea .’ 89 This disposition can be interpreted as a reference to 
 number of public values such as affordability of public ser- 
ices, sustainability, inclusiveness, and promotion of the local 
conomy. 
Before delving into an overview of these public values, it is 
mportant to distinguish between the creation of public value 
hich aims at the production of value for society and the pro- 
ection of public values as such. The creation of public value is 
 broader approach which ensures that a public organisation 
eets the needs and expectations of citizens. This approach 
s based on the so-called ‘public value management paradigm’ 
hich seeks to gain a legitimate mandate from citizens to pur- 
ue the public interest by advancing the efficient performance 
f public authorities, accountability, responsiveness to public 
eeds, and trust.90 In order to achieve legitimacy, public au- 
horities need to show that they are transparent, accountable,
nd open to the input of citizens.91 Achieving public value in 
he context of the digitisation of public services has been re- 
arded as a way to improve efficiency in government, improve 
ublic services to citizens, and social values such as inclusion,
emocracy, transparency, and participation.92 Since the liber- 
lisation movement, the conflict between individual and pub- 
ic values has made it more difficult to find a balance between 
he creation of public value in an economic sense and the pro- 
ection of public values. 
A first set of public values that is often mentioned in schol- 
rship and policy documents pertaining to local public author- 
ties refers to the quality and affordability of public services.93 
ities also have a particular interest in safeguarding the pub- 
ic values of availability, stability, and sustainability of certain 
ervices of general economic interest such as energy.94 
Accountability and transparency are often presented as 
ey public values that are being affected in different ways 
y public authorities’ reliance on digital platforms. These two 
alues are for example underlined as key public values of Bris- 
ol’s social policy and all ‘governance arrangements are to be 91 This public-value movement towards openness and trans- 
arency with reliance on technology was particularly visible 
uring the Obama Administration in the United States and is 
resent in numerous European openness strategies, see Beth 
oveck, WikiGovernment: How Technology Can Make Governments Bet- 
er, Democracy Stronger, and Citizens More Powerful (Brookings 2010). 
92 Twizeyimana and Andersson, fn 38. 
93 Hans de Bruijn and Willemijn Dicke, ‘Strategies for Safeguard- 
ng Public Values in Liberalized Utility Sectors’ (2006) 84(3) Public 
dministration 717. 
94 Marga G Edens and Saskia Lavrijssen, ‘Balancing Public Values 
uring the Energy Transition—How Can German and Dutch DSOs 
afeguard sustainability’ (2019) 128 Energy Policy 57; Catherine 
utler, Christina Demski, Karen Parkhill, Nick Pidgeon and Alexa 
pence, ‘Public values for energy futures: Framing, indeterminacy 
nd policy making’ (2015) 87 Energy Policy 665. 






































































agreed, in order to achieve transparency, and ensure account-
ability to all of our stakeholders, including our customers, con-
tractors, suppliers, our partners and auditors’.95 
Public values that refer to public services also go beyond
their quality and affordability. They also include the neutrality
of their provision to citizens, that is, public authorities should
be politically neutral and objective in their communication
with citizens and provide services to all citizens without im-
posing certain political views.96 Reliance on digital platforms
for the provision of public services rarely fulfills this mission.
Platforms values which are primarily driven by individualism,
tend not to service the primary interests of society, but rather
see public administration as a contracting client or as a hur-
dle that needs to be overcome, in order to have legal access
to the market. For example, while Airbnb may contend that
the platform aims to support local communities, it not pri-
marily driven by this public value but by their own financial
interests. A second aspect where this neutrality may easily
disappear refers to the use of digital platforms in the context
of smart cities to influence the behavior of citizens in smart
cities, for example, through nudging techniques.97 When in-
formation is filtered, omitted or transmitted in a non-neutral
way in order to influence the choices of citizens, the autonomy
of citizens may be significantly affected.98 Public authorities
have the duty to protect information neutrality and diversity. 
A second set of public values that we often identify in leg-
islation and policy documents have a social nature. This set
includes for example inclusiveness, equality of treatment and
access, affordability of (public and private) housing, safety, and
the livability of cities. While these values may resonate with
most of us nowadays, it is worth underlining that equality of
access and treatment when it comes to public services are rel-
atively recent public values.99 Digital platforms can on the one
hand ensure that more citizens and visitors have access to
digital services but on the other they may also exclude less
tech-savvy citizens if the services are only available online.100 
In many cities throughout the world (including Western coun-
tries) the digital divide and the limited digital literacy of many95 Bristol City Council, ‘Social Value Policy: Creating Social Value 
in Bristol’ (Bristol.gov.uk, January 2019) < https://www.bristol.gov. 
uk/documents/20182/239382/Social+Value+Policy+-+approved+ 
March+2016- 1.pdf/391b817b- 55fc- 40c3- 8ea2- d3dfb07cc2a0 > . 
96 Alberto Alemanno and Alessandro Spina, ‘Nudging Legally: On 
the Checks and Balances of Behavioral Regulation’ (2014) 12 I • CON 
429. 
97 Sofia Ranchordás, ‘Nudging citizens through technology in 
smart cities’ (2019) International Review of Law, Computers 
and Technology ( https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/ 
13600869.2019.1590928 ). 
98 Brent D Mittelstadt et al., ‘The Ethics of Algorithms: Mapping 
the Debate’ (2016) Big Data & Society 1, 9. 
99 Bannister and Conolly, fn 85, 124. 
00 Beth Simone Noveck, Smart Citizens, Smarter State: The Technolo- 
gies of Expertise and the Future of Governing (Harvard University Press 
2015); Beth C Weitzman, Diana Silver and Caitlyn Brazill, ‘Efforts 
to Improve Public Policy and Programs through Data Practice: Ex- 
periences in 15 Distressed American Cities’ (2006) Public Adminis- 
tration Review 386, 387. See also Simone Noveck, ‘Peer to Patent”: 
Collective Intelligence, Open Review, and Patent Reform’ (2006) 20 








thousands of citizens is deepening inequality and excluding
many residents from city services.101 
The Toronto Public Service By-law mentions explicitly the
need to promote diversity as an integral part of Toronto’s
civic identity.102 Bristol also comprises inclusiveness as one
of the key values of the city’ social value policy.103 As a conse-
quence of the growth of Airbnb and other home-sharing plat-
forms, investment in private houses for tourism has become
such an important source of income that residents are leav-
ing cities. While platforms values convey flexibility in hous-
ing, this has meant that poor residents living in touristic areas
have been terrorized to leave their houses which will later be
transformed into Airbnb-houses. 
Third, economic growth and the promotion of local econ-
omy appear to be also public values highly underlined in local
policy documents. For example, the city council of Bristol en-
hances the importance of promoting ‘the local economy, so
that micro, small and medium sized enterprises and the vol-
untary and community sector in Bristol can thrive,’ ‘creating
or promoting local employment, training and inclusive eco-
nomic sustainability’.104 
Fourth, Amsterdam as well as other Dutch smart cities
have also enhanced the need to advance a new set of pub-
lic values in recent policy documents, such as privacy, auton-
omy, and broad democratic participation.105 In order to protect
these public values in data-driven urban contexts, local public
bodies have invested in the development of ethical and data
protection impact assessments and hiring their own data sci-
entists and analysts to assess the quality of the data collected
in smart cities. 
To conclude, traditional cities tend to emerge as a result
of a complex interaction between different elements: geogra-
phy, economy, existence of raw materials.106 In the digital age,
technology is transforming the planning, organisation, and
governance of cities by their ability to forecast new events and
needs ( e.g ., criminality, sustainability) and thus better allocate
city resources.107 However, technology should nonetheless be
used to pursue these values and not the other way around. 01 See for instance Harlan Yu and David G Robinson, ‘The New 
Ambiguity of ‘Open Government’ (2012) 59 UCLA Law Review Dis- 
course 178. 
02 Chapter 192 of Toronto’s Municipal Code incorporated in 2015 
the Toronto Public Service By-law which includes a list of public 
values that aim to guide public services and the management of 
resources in this city. 
03 Fn 92. 
04 Bristol City Council, ‘Social Value Policy: Creating Social Value 
in Policy’, available at https://www.bristol.gov.uk/documents/ 
20182/239382/Social+Value+Policy+-+approved+March+2016-1. 
pdf/391b817b- 55fc- 40c3- 8ea2- d3dfb07cc2a0 (last accessed on 
October 7, 2019). 
05 Rathenau Instituut, ‘Hoe beschermen gemeenten pub- 
lieke waarden in de slimme stad?’ [How Do Municipalities 
Protect Public Values in the Smart City?], available at https: 
//www.rathenau.nl/nl/digitale- samenleving/hoe- beschermen- 
gemeenten- publieke- waarden- de- slimme- stad (last accessed on 
October 7, 2019). 
06 See generally Steven B Johnson, Emergence: The Connected Lives 
of Ants, Brains, Cities, and Software (Scribner, 2001). 
07 Terry Farrell, ‘City Making: Many Hands, Over Time’(2018) 13 
Journal of Planning & Environmental Law 6. 

































































































111 See, for example, Rob Kitchin, ‘The Real-time City? Big Data 
and Smart Urbanism’ (2014) 79 GeoJournal 1-14; Rob Kitchin, ‘The 
Promise and Peril of Smart Cities’ (2015) 26(2) Computers and Law. 
112 For a legal analysis of the privacy implications of the 
widespread collection of data in cities, see van Zoonen, fn 9. 
113 Laura Bliss, ‘How Smart Should a City Be? Toronto Is Finding 
Out’ ( Citylab , 7 September 2018) < https://www.citylab.com/design/ 
2018/09/how- smart- should- a- city- be- toronto- is- finding- out/ 
569116/ > . 
114 Ibid. 
115 Ibid. 
116 For a literature review on the definition of smart city, see for .2. Balancing platform values with city values 
t first sight, digital platforms privilege specific values in the 
latform economy: convenience and short-time access over 
ong-term engagements, flexibility over stable employment,
haring of information, objects, and experiences over owner- 
hip and discretion.108 Platforms in the sharing economy also 
laim that they promote sustainable transactions. Many cit- 
zens have come to accept these values and, in most cases,
ational and local governments have found a way to regulate 
hem without interfering with the essence of these services.
o illustrate, in most cities Airbnb hosts are allowed to rent 
ooms to tourists without obtaining a license as long as they 
o so only for a short period of time. Airbnb also claims on a 
egular basis that they provide ‘healthy, diverse, inclusive and 
ustainable’ travel and aim to benefit ‘all of its stakeholders,
ncluding (….) communities’.109 
Despite this appearance of harmony with local communi- 
ies and possibly their values, the platform economy is one of 
he different urban contexts where we observe the expansion 
f platform values. Legal literature has nonetheless not yet 
iscussed the broader phenomenon underlying the advance- 
ent of platform values at local level. This is particularly im- 
ortant as it has become clear that platform values are not al- 
ays aligned with national or local values established in exist- 
ng legal frameworks. Local residents may not wish to benefit 
rom the flexibility and cosmopolitan interaction that Airbnb 
r other platforms seek to promote. Rather, the safety, afford- 
bility, and family-friendliness of their neighbourhoods may 
e the values that they prefer to hold on to and have entrusted 
heir local representatives to protect. 
In addition, digital platforms seek to advance more than 
conomic values. As important vehicles of news, advertise- 
ent, and political influence, digital platforms also appear 
o have intrinsic values regarding for example hate speech,
oting behavior, sustainability, and the protection of human 
ights.110 These values are implicitly or explicitly listed in 
arge platforms’ community guidelines. Platforms advance 
hese values for example through the promotion of messages 
o their users on online community forums or the publica- 
ion of codes of conduct ( e.g ., Airbnb’s Non-discrimination pol- 
cy). Platforms encourage users who detect content contrary 
o their ‘values’ to report it and enforce it themselves by sanc- 
ioning users with the removal of content or shutting down ac- 
ounts. The promotion of platform values is nonetheless prob- 
ematic for several reasons: first, it is unclear what the nature 
nd relevance of these values are. As platforms become essen- 
ial infrastructures for communication, business, social and 
olitical influence, platform values are starting to affect the 
ublic sphere and the public interest. However, here a second 
roblematic aspect arises: platform values may differ from na- 
ional values. In a certain jurisdiction, the legal and social ac- 
eptance of renting out (even if only sporadically) apartments 
o strangers or even the definition of ‘hate speech’ may be per- 
eived in very different terms from those adopted by a plat- 08 Lobel, fn 11. 
09 Airbnb, ‘About us’ < https://press.airbnb.com/about-us/ > . 







orm’s online community guideline. Despite the alleged good 
ntentions of platforms, the merit of many of their initiatives 
o reduce discrimination, and their attempt to take into ac- 
ount local customs, the law and values of platforms are not 
lways aligned with the law and values of the land. This ten- 
ion has become particularly challenging in the last years as 
latforms started playing a growing role in the provision of 
ublic services ( e.g ., crowd-management), for example, in the 
ontext of smart cities.111 
In smart cities, IBM, Sidewalk Labs (a subsidiary of Alpha- 
et to which Google also pertains) or Huawei collect and pro- 
ess personal and urban data through Internet-of-Things, big 
ata, and algorithms.112 In Toronto, Sidewalk Labs is design- 
ng a new district to ‘tackle the challenges of urban growth’ 
hat would collect data from a wide range of sources to fa- 
ilitate mobility, logistics, and sustainability solutions.113 In 
pril 2019, the Canadian Civil Liberties Association sued Wa- 
erfront Toronto, the publicly funded entity responsible for the 
roject, and the Canadian government at three levels (federal,
rovincial, and municipal powers) over this plan. This innova- 
ive plan has been shrouded in secrecy and opacity and has 
een accompanied by raising concerns (for example, the lim- 
ted protection of the privacy of Toronto residents).114 The me- 
ia has reported that resigning members of the Waterfront 
oronto and the civil society are particularly concerned with 
he protection of Canadian values and the fact that SideWalk 
abs is the one defining the values fed into the digital technol- 
gy employed in the city rather than democratically elected 
fficials.115 Toronto is one of many examples analyzed in this 
rticle, of a controversial partnership where digital platforms 
eek to interfere with local values by promoting a technocratic 
iscourse that is susceptible of violating important public val- 
es ( e.g ., privacy and autonomy of citizens) and the limit the
articipation of less tech-savvy citizens. 
In the last decade, a growing number of cities and local 
uthorities have embraced digital technology either to im- 
rove the efficiency and sustainability of their services or with 
he ambition to transform their urban centers into so-called 
smart cities.’ 116 Since there is no consensual definition of 
smart city’—and this article does not only focus on smart- 
ity platforms—we will refer to urban centers that rely more 
enerally on digital platforms to improve the quality of living 
f their citizens and visitors as ‘digital cities’.117 nstance, Margarita Angelidou, ‘The Role of Smart City Character- 
stics in the Plans of Fifteen Cities’ (2017) 24 Journal of Urban Tech- 
ology 3; Andrea Caragliu, Chiara del Bo and Peter Nijkamp, ‘Smart 
ities in Europe’ (2011) 18 Journal of Urban Technology 6. 
17 The concepts of ‘smart city’ and ‘digital city’ are distinct. See 
enata Dameri, ‘Comparing Smart and Digital City: Initiatives 












































































performance or inadequate performance by the seller or supplier 
of any of the contractual obligations, including the option of offset- 
ting a debt owed to the seller or supplier against any claim which 
the consumer may have against him’. In a smart city, citizens and visitors can use different dig-
ital platforms to obtain both public and private services ( e.g .,
finding tourist accommodation, identify the fastest route to
go from one point to the other). Thanks to platforms, citizens
have become more mobile, several services are more conve-
nient, and cities have the potential to become more sustain-
able.118 However, public authorities may only collect this data,
contract with private tech companies providing information
services, and regulate local services to promote tourism in the
strict pursuit of the public interest and safeguard of public val-
ues.119 
4. Normative approaches to public-private 
values supporting local public-interest technology 
The rationale behind the existence of public administration
is to give an institutional setting to the enactment of public
values in society.120 As seen in Section 3 , these values shape
public policy, public morality, and define various groups of in-
dividuals and their preferences. Within an increasingly digi-
tised society, public values are at risk from two perspectives.
First, Big Tech may replace public values with private values,
which may be opaque and undesirable. Second, by enforc-
ing privately-held socio-legal standards, Big Tech may be seen
to compete for the sovereignty of law-making. Each of these
points will be discussed below, in order to propose new the-
oretical and practical solutions for the tensions that we have
seen to arise between the public and the private spheres. 
Throughout this article we have tried to give illustrations
of both public values and platform values. At first sight, these
two notions seem to clash when platforms present them-
selves as guardians of public values: fairness and equality as
legal standards and public values will not be interpreted in the
same way by the private sector. A telling example in this re-
spect are the lengthy exclusion or limitation of liability clauses
that companies like Airbnb and Lime unilaterally impose on
their customers. If a property on Airbnb or a Lime e-scooter
have a hidden defect that causes a loss to their respective
landlords or renters, the law deems it fair for the victim to
have a means of both a remedy and an action for them to
be placed in a position where the loss would not have oc-
curred.121 Yet in their ToS, both companies take any precau-and Strategies in Amsterdam and Genoa. Are They Digital and/or 
Smart?’ in Renata Dameri and Camille Rosenthal-Sabroux (eds) 
Smart City: How to Create Public and Economic Value with High Tech- 
nology in Urban Space (Springer 2014). 
18 Kitchin, fn 106. 
19 See Christopher Bovis, Public-Private Partnerships in the European 
Union (Routledge, 2014). 
20 Hofmann, Sæbø, Braccini and Za, fn 47. 
21 Unfair Contract Terms Directive, Annex, point a shows there 
is a presumption that a term limiting the legal liability of a seller 
in the case of a personal injury is unfair: ‘(a) excluding or limiting 
the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event of the death 
of a consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an 
act or omission of that seller or supplier. Point (b) of the Annex 
specifies that a standard term excluding or limiting access to jus- 
tice is equally presumed to be unfair: (b) ‘inappropriately exclud- 
ing or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis- d -vis the seller 





tion possible not to be held liable for losses that mandatory
law may impose on them. Therefore, they try to exclude their
potential accountability. 
However, in other ways, private and public values may be
very similar, if not complementary.122 The sharing economy
is said to have led to the creation of a market niche that
promotes sustainability because of its increasing profitabil-
ity.123 If additional mandatory values are imbued in the private
sector through top-down regulation (e.g., fuel-related limita-
tions and restrictions), sustainability may very well become a
shared value. Additional private values we identified earlier,
such as collaboration or affordability, may be associated with
the public values of participation and citizen care (welfare),
as citizens are expected to actively contribute to democratic
decision-making or standard setting.124 Moreover, the dynam-
ics between values and the interests of institutions or com-
panies upholding them have similarities as well. On the one
hand, private values try to reconcile customer centricity with
the inherent economic interests of a given business. On the
other hand, public values are caught in between the promo-
tion of the greater good of society and the political influence
exercised on this process. 
We thus posit that in order to better understand how the
private values of Big Tech platforms and the public values of
state institutions interact and affect one another, it is nec-
essary to move from a narrative of opposition to a model of
complementarity at a level which goes deeper than existing
approaches to co-regulation. Differences in interests do not
always generate differences in values, and if digital platforms
see municipalities as more than clients, but as co-creators of
business opportunities which benefit local communities, this
can shape a new model of local public-interest technology,
dependent on the values shared by both platforms and local
authorities. Any transportation company, not just Lime, will
make safety one of its core values, because its profits depend
on public trust, which can be broken easily.125 Traffic rules
and standards adopted by national and municipal authorities22 Unger, van Der Linde and Getzner, fn 47, 230. See also Kon- 
stantin Petrichev, Susan Thorp, ‘The private value of public pen- 
sions’, (2008) 42 Insurance: Mathematics and Economics 1138; 
Bram Klievink, Nitesh Bharosa and Yao-Hua Tan, ‘The collabora- 
tive realisation of public values and business goals: Governance 
and infrastructure of public–private information platforms’ (2016) 
33(1) Government Information Quarterly 67. 
23 Harald Heinrichs, ‘Sharing economy: A potential new pathway 
to sustainability’ (2013) 22(4) GAIA-Ecological Perspectives for Sci- 
ence and Society 228; Boyd Cohen and Jan Kietzmann, ‘Ride on! 
Mobility business models for the sharing economy’ (2014) 27(3) Or- 
ganisation & Environment 279. 
24 See for instance Juho Hamari, Mimmi Sjöklint and Antti Ukko- 
nen, ‘The sharing economy: Why people participate in collabora- 
tive consumption’ (2016) 67(9) Journal of the association for infor- 
mation science and technology 2047. 
25 James Tapper, ‘Television presenter Emily Hartridge 
dies in electric scooter crash’ ( The Guardian , 14 July 
2019) < https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2019/jul/13/ 
tv- presenter- emily- hartridge- dies- in- scooter- crash > . 







































































































qually reflect safety as a value, as do sanctions meant to en- 
orce them. By following a narrative that divides values into 
ublic versus private, there is no room left for reflecting on 
ow the private sector can strengthen the public sector and 
ice-versa. Indeed, there are many risks that need to be care- 
ully considered when blurring this line, and we critically ex- 
lored some of them in Section 3 . As we have explained above,
ne of the arguments against digitalizing public infrastruc- 
ure through private services has been that platforms may re- 
hape public values in smart cities and advance a technocratic 
iscourse that may exclude a number of underrepresented 
roups and less tech-savvy citizens. Yet, exclusion is not only 
 problem associated with the Big Tech platforms of the 21st 
entury, given that exclusion arising out of technology adop- 
ion often reveals more traditional causes, such as ‘inequality 
nd social exclusion in the e-society are partly rooted in the 
apability to access and use information rather than just in 
he access to technological resources’.126 
This brings us to the second point of this normative sec- 
ion. As functional sovereigns, digital platforms not only gen- 
rate the private economic and legal standards that define 
heir interaction with the users and thus society at large, but 
hey are also the administrators of these standards. In the 
irbnb example mentioned earlier in this paper, the need be- 
ind an agreement between Airnbn and the municipality of 
msterdam arose out of the convergence of two general inter- 
sts. On the one hand, Big Tech companies want to retain as 
uch independence as possible in setting their own limits to 
roducts and services. On the other hand, municipalities sim- 
ly do not have the capacity to enforce all their rules in the 
latform age as this would involve in some cases daily door- 
o-door inspections to verify who is renting their house legally 
nd who is not.127 If municipal regulations limit the number 
f days for which a home may be rented out, or imposes li- 
ensing requirements, the consistent and fair enforcement of 
uch standards is impossible, because the resources necessary 
or digital monitoring and e-enforcement are at the moment 
oo high. Moreover, local government may not have access 
o platform data, which renders monitoring attempts some- 
hat powerless. In consequence, local government needs to 
ollaborate with digital platforms just as much as digital plat- 
orms need the support of local government. As Cohen and 
undararajan put it, ‘digital platforms [should be utilized] as 
artners in the regulation of exchange, rather than […] as ad- 
ersaries or entities that require governmental regulation.128 26 Mike Cushman and Rachel McLean, ‘Exclusion, inclusion and 
hanging the face of information systems research’ (2008) 21(3) In- 
ormation Technology & People 213. 
27 See for instance the legal struggles of the municipal- 
ty of Amsterdam in its e-enforcement strategies, in a case 
here user information was scraped by the municipality from 
irbnb. District Court of Amsterdam, judgment of 27 June 2018, 
CLI:NL:RBAMS:2018:4442. 
28 Molly Cohen and Arun Sundararajan, ‘Self-Regulation and In- 
ovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing Economy’ (2015-2016) 82 U 
hi L Rev Dialogue 132. See also Antonio Cordella and Leslie Will- 
ocks, ‘Government policy, public value and IT outsourcing: The 
trategic case of ASPIRE’ (2012) 21(4) The Journal of Strategic Infor- 
















The approach we propose consists in the creation of a le- 
al framework to facilitate this collaboration. Numerous tech- 
ology companies aim to disrupt the market with aggressive 
usiness models which take advantage of legal uncertainty.129 
his is in some cases possible because laws that were made to 
t other decades need time to be adapted by the judiciary or by
aw-makers, and disruptive innovation thrives – at least tem- 
orarily – in this uncertainty.130 Evidently, legal uncertainty 
annot be fully removed, but it can be improved. One such 
mprovement we propose is the creation of a legal framework 
t municipal level for technology companies launching new 
roducts and services that have a direct impact on public in- 
rastructure (and thus on public values). This legal framework 
an, instead of regulating specific technologies, focus on a le- 
al duty to negotiate the conditions of the economic activ- 
ty with the municipality in good faith. In the case of Side- 
alk Labs and IBM Smart Cities, this is already happening. As 
he public sector takes on the role of customer, success sto- 
ies have already developed, such as the case of government- 
riven sharing economy services in Seoul.131 This does not 
ean, however, that success comes without criticism. Accord- 
ng to Hofmann et al., in the sharing economy setting, the pub- 
ic sector is dependent on the functionality of the provider,
nd this dependency ‘can endanger the robustness of the pub- 
ic sector’.132 However, these arguments can be made for any 
unctionality that is outsourced by local government through 
endering procedures (which may very well apply to digital 
ervices), including services as trivial as catering for the em- 
loyees of a given municipality. On a positive note, outsourc- 
ng infrastructural needs (e.g.. micromobility, urban planning) 
or data-driven solution has a wealth of benefits. Firstly, cities 
ould be able to have access to state-of-the-art services they 
o not have the resources to design internally, and could 
hus better serve communities. As an example, bike-sharing 
chemes can be a saving service for large cities that struggle 
ith air pollution and traffic congestion: in 2018, Romanian 
ompany Pegas launched its bike-sharing system consisting 
n the deployment of over 2000 bikes in predefined parking 
paces, with the goal of improving the livelihood of locals and 
ourists alike, while promoting sustainable urban mobility,133 
hich the municipality of Bucharest tried to achieve on ear- 
ier occasions with limited success. Secondly, digital platforms 
an generate new business models in the form of public- 
nterest technology provided to public authorities instead of 
o consumers or other businesses. Public-interest technology 
s an umbrella term for a plethora of options bringing to- 
ether technologists and public administration, and its bur- 
eoning significance for the convergence of public and private 29 Lobel fn 11, 92. 
30 Hannah A Posen, ‘Ridesharing in the sharing economy: Should 
egulators impose Über regulations on Uber?’ (2015) 101(1) Iowa 
aw Review 405. 
31 M Jae Moon, ‘Government-driven sharing economy: lessons 
rom the sharing city initiative of the Seoul metropolitan govern- 
ent’ (2017) 33(2) Journal of Developing Societies 223. 
32 Hofmann, Sæbø, Braccini and Za, fn 47. 
33 Irina Marica, ‘Local producer ready to launch 
mart bike sharing system in Bucharest’ ( Romania In- 
ider , 10 May 2018) < https://www.romania-insider.com/ 
egas- smart- bike- sharing- system- bucharest > . 





























































interests raises a multiplicity of additional questions for legal
and interdisciplinary research.134 Lastly, public-private part-
nerships where the different parties have the real ability to
discuss terms and their underlying values can help promote
mandatory values more consistently in order to protect the
public values that may be at stake with the rise of data-driven
innovation.135 
5. Conclusion 
Nowadays, most digital services are built around platforms,
which we understand to be a digital system that reduces
transaction costs by organizing decentralized information,
matching supply and demand, and allowing for different
forms of collaboration.136 This broad definition of platforms
that we have used in this article primarily encompasses the
emergence of the digital platform business model which has
disrupted the economy ( e.g ., Airbnb disrupted the tourist ac-
commodation sector) and shifted firms’ competition models
to data-driven systems.137 This concept also includes at least
two types of platforms that are becoming increasingly visi-
ble in cities: digital platforms developed for smart cities and
‘sharing-economy’ platforms. 
New digital platforms can be used for municipal manage-
ment, public safety and environmental protection, as well
as smart transportation, smart government, smart education,
and smart agriculture. While the power of platforms has been
comprehensively analyzed when it comes to its global im-
pact, the legal literature has so far only superficially touched
upon what this power means for the local values represented
and implemented by local authorities. Sharing economy and
smart city platforms are, to this extent, two telling examples. 
After establishing the theoretical framework relating to the
notion of value, in this paper we provided an overview of se-34 For an overview of this concept, see Bruce Schneier, ‘Public- 
Interest Technology Resources’ ( Public-Interest Tech , 30 September 
2019) < https://public-interest-tech.com > . 
35 Lin Li, Philip Hookon Park and Sung-Byung Yang, ‘The role of 
public-private partnership in constructing the smart transporta- 
tion city: A case of the bike sharing platform’ (2018) Asia Pacific 
Journal of Tourism Research 1. 
36 See for instance, Annabelle Gawer (ed), Platforms, Markets and 
Innovation (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009); Carlo M Rosotto et al., 
‘Digital Platforms: A Literature Review and Policy Implications for 
Development’ (2018) 19 Competition and Regulation in Network 
Industries 93. 
37 Aneesh Zutshi and Antonio Grilo,’The Emergence of Digital 
Platforms: A Conceptual Platform Architecture and impact on In- 
dustrial Engineering’ (2019) 136 Computers & Industrial Engineer- 
ing 546. On the competition impact of digital platforms, see also 
Ariel Ezrachi and Maurice Stucke, Virtual Competition: The Promises 
and Perils of the Algorithm-Driven Economy (Harvard University Press 
2016). lected private values extracted from the ToS and marketing
materials of four different platforms: Airbnb, Lime, Sidewalk
Labs and IBM Smart Cities. We then scrutinized interdisci-
plinary academic scholarship as well as an illustrative number
of documents compiled by local authorities, to define and ex-
emplify public values, and to critically address the potential
conflict between the public and private value divide, with a
specific emphasis on the interests of local communities. 
We argued that regardless of the value-creation benefits
produced by digital platforms, public authorities should be
aware of the risks of technocratic discourses and potential
conflicts between platform and local values. In this context,
we suggested a normative framework focusing on two points:
departing from values shared by platforms and authorities,
in order to shape a new kind of knowledge-service creation,
namely local public-interest technology; and addressing the
digital enforcement issue driven by the functional sovereignty
role of platforms, by proposing a negotiated contractual sys-
tem that seeks to balance platform values with public values.
While the example of smart and sharing cities provides a
resourceful starting point in the advancement of the public-
interest technology, this concept is still in its infancy and more
research is necessary to determine its meaning, scope, and
implications for society. The same can be said for the need
to elaborate on new models of negotiated regulation and co-
regulation that can bring together platforms and local author-
ities on the basis of their shared values and guarantee a closer
alignment of platform and public values. 
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